## Advocacy

GIS tech is low now in developing countries.

**Ouma 8** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

The **use** and application **of GIS in developing countries, particularly** continental **Africa, is still** an **exclusive** domain **of** just **a few elites**. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that **GIS** application **is a relatively recent tech**nology **in the continent**. As such, urban planning has largely been done without considering GIS. This paper looks at Kenya’s urban planning in view of the infrastructural pressures exerted by the high number of people who migrate from rural to urban areas. The recent demolition of residential houses and business premises within the country in order to provide space for the expansion of existing roads or construction of new ones are discussed. The paper also points out planning dilemma that face the city council of Nairobi, Kenya’s capital city, in the light of rapidly increasing urban population. In view of all these urban planning challenges, the paper discusses the role of GIS application in future urban planning in Kenya. The paper concludes by identifying GIS needs such as participatory GIS planning, a skilled and stable human resource base among others. In an attempt **to mainstream GIS** application **in developing countries** such as Kenya**, the paper puts emphasis on institutional networking** and linkages **as being** among **key** areas for future co-operation.

GIS tech prioritizes environmental protection over resource extraction.

**Kuhn 13** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Some of the people I most respect and admire for their work in promoting forest conservation and stewardship of all of our natural resources are foresters. They often refer to themselves as forest ecologists as well as foresters, an important distinction that I want to make as clear as I can in this brief essay. There are many foresters who are driven by motives and methods that do not truly respect forest ecology. These industrial foresters have developed a culture much like modern agriculture, asserting that they can replace natural forests with tree crops, thereby increasing economic benefits from harvesting trees from these management units which they refer to as forests. In my view of life, which comes from both western culture and the ancient teachings of many tribal cultures, forests are created by Nature and are a gift from Mother Earth, the Sun and ultimately from the Creator. The natural ecosystems created by this life-giving process over eons of time contain a mix of interacting species best suited to the bio-physical conditions at each unique location. This view makes me and others who respect and value Nature and forest life part of the naturalist culture, which includes **ecoforestry**. It **is** very **different from** the **industrial culture which values financial gain above Nature.** As a student working on a degree in forest management back in the 1960′s I became disillusioned with the university’s required courses. They were mostly about how to log forests to maximize industrial profits and produce a steady revenue flow to government ministries. There was one course in forest ecology and one in forest soils, but the rest were mostly about forest engineering and various aspects of financial management of timber and pulpwood resources. I had to change majors and get my degrees in geography and ecology in order to pursue the career path that was best for me. Forest aesthetics, biodiversity and soil and watershed protection considerations over the long term (seven generations in First Nations’ culture) are not the focus of most of the forest management plans which are being approved by our government ministries today. Outside ‘consultations’ are supposed to address these concerns, but these inputs are not given equal weight with so called economic development considerations. Ecoforestry on the other hand focuses on watersheds and/or ecological land types, seeking understanding of the interactions taking place in these ecosystems. **In our modern info**rmation **tech**nology **world,** forest and wildlife **ecologists model and monitor natural processes** and human impacts **in** natural **resource stewardship**/management **programs, unless** this is **precluded by** industrial forestry and other **‘development’ interests.** The **use of** ecosystem models such as geographic information systems (**GIS**) **are absolutely essential if true stewardship of** the **natural resources** our children and grandchildren will depend on for their well-being **is** ever **to be accomplished**. In addition, **we, as** citizens and **stewards of our environment, must make sure that** the **cumulative impacts of** logging and all **resource extraction activities** on our forests, wetlands and waters **are being monitored and assessed on an ongoing basis to ensure that our ecosystems remain healthy.** In my opinion, government ministries upon which we rely to protect our forests and related natural resources should be employing more people educated in biological and earth sciences who demonstrate good ecological intelligence and a good grounding in the land ethic, established by Aldo Leopold in 1948. Along with forest ecology and ecoforestry, as well as a focus on ecosystem and human health, they can provide us with the more complete view needed for good stewardship.

Thus the **plan**: Developing countries should adopt geographic information systems regarding agriculture, forestry, mining, oceans, and oil. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until checked in cross-ex. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism.

**Nelson 8** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

Advantage 1 is Warming

GIS is key to solve deforestation which causes warming. The impact is agriculture loss.

**Esri 13** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

The Clinton Climate Initiative (CCI) Forestry Program develops forestry projects and carbon measurement systems that help governments and local communities receive compensation for preserving and regrowing forests. CCI uses **GIS** technology to **help[s] countries monitor** their **carbon levels**. Global warming is caused by increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere from burning fossil fuels, and **deforestation accounts for** about **15 percent of total** carbon dioxide **emissions in the world. Scientists predict that if governments** and communities **don’t take action** to reduce carbon dioxide emissions**, our world will face** increasingly **drastic consequences** ranging **from** stronger **heat waves to** more **droughts and floods to increasing sea level. All these affect agriculture, food security,** viability of coastal cities, **and water availability around the world**. To reduce emissions, governments and economies must use less fossil fuels and increase the use of energy-efficient and renewable technologies. The CCI Forestry Program focuses on helping **developing countries** reverse deforestation and plant new trees. By showing that they **can monitor and verify** the **reduction of** their carbon dioxide **emissions**, countries become eligible for funding to manage their forest programs and other lowcarbon economic activities. CCI uses GIS technology as a centerpiece of forest carbon measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems for developing countries. **GIS** is one of three legs of the platform—data, models, and GIS—that **allow countries to determine how much carbon they have**, how it is changing, **and how** the **drivers of deforestation and forest degradation can be monitored and adjusted** as required.

Destruction of agriculture risks extinction.

**FAO 11** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

As pressure on the world's water resources reaches unsustainable levels in an increasing number of regions, **a "business-as-usual" approach to** economic **development and** natural **resource management** **will no longer be possible**, FAO said today. Agriculture will be key to the implementation of sustainable water management, the Organization told attendees at an international meeting on water, energy and food security being held in Bonn. Speaking on the sidelines at the Bonn 2011 Nexus Conference, FAO Assistant Director-General for Natural Resources, Alexander Mueller, said: "**Tackling** the challenges of **food security,** economic **development and energy security in a context of ongoing population growth will require** a renewed and re-imagined focus on **agricultural development.** Agriculture can and should become the backbone of tomorrow's green economy." The conference in Bonn has been convened by Germany's Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development as a lead up to the UN's "Rio+20" Conference on Sustainable development in June 2012. It brings together leading actors in economic development, natural resource management and environmental policy and the food and energy sectors to look for new approaches to managing the interconnections between water, energy and food. Holistic vision, sectoral solutions FAO estimates that **to feed** a world population expected to number around **9 billion people in 2050, global food production will need to be increased by 70 percent**. Global energy demand will increase by 36 percent by 2035, and competition for water between farming, cities and industry will continue to intensify as a result. "It's time to stop treating food, water and energy as separate issues and tackle the challenge of intelligently balancing the needs of these three sectors, building on synergies, finding opportunities to reduce waste and identifying ways that water can be shared and reused, rather than competed for," Mueller said. Agriculture at the center of the nexus According to Mueller, agriculture lies at the centre of the "water-energy-food nexus. "**When you start looking at** the issue of **how we are going to provide food, water, light, heat and other services** and products **for 9 billion people, it becomes** quite **clear that agriculture is** perhaps **the linchpin of everything**,**"** he said. "If we have the political will and farsightedness, we can make agriculture the engine of tomorrow's green economy. Climate-smart farming systems that make efficient use of resources like water, land, and energy must become the basis of tomorrow's agricultural economy."

Deforestation independently causes extinction.

**WWF no date** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

**Forests are vital to life on Earth. They purify the air we breathe, filter the water we drink**, prevent erosion, and act as an important buffer against climate change. Forests offer a home to much of the world’s diverse array of plants and animals **and provide essential** natural **resources from timber and food to medicinal plants**. Forests also support the lives of local communities and help them to thrive. But forests around the world are under threat. **Despite the key role forests play in the world's environmental** and economic **health, we continue to lose forests**, along with the endangered animals that live in them, **at** the rate of **36 football fields per minute.** Illegal logging, **poor forest management practices**, and growing demand for forest and agricultural products **contribute to** their **rampant destruction. Deforestation is especially severe in** some of the world’s most biologically diverse regions, such as **the Amazon,** Borneo and Sumatra, the **Congo Basin, and** the **Russian Far East**. As a result, nearly half the world’s original forests have been lost.

The plan allows for selective forestry which is comparatively better for the climate.

**Kuhn 13** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

**Stewardship** of primarily natural forests **doesn’t require ending forest harvesting**. Commercial forestry and other **extractive enterprises have a role** in natural resource stewardship and land use decision-making, but they should not dominate these processes. **Selective harvesting of over-crowded and unhealthy trees** on an ongoing basis can provide truly sustainable jobs for local people. Industrial foresters have been saying for decades that the only way to harvest the magnificent west coast rain forests is to clearcut them. It just isn’t so! Selective harvesting is practiced in many of the world’s forests and British Columbia’s outstanding ecoforestry pioneer Merv Wilkinson showed us that selection forestry **can produce** sustainable **ecological** and economic **benefits** in our west coast forests. The **ecoforestry** harvesting approach **benefits wildlife by letting more energy from the Sun reach** the shrubs, grasses and herbs in the **lower canopy levels** of a healthy forest. **It maintains a healthier soil** cover, full of life and **holding more water and nutrients than** the **compacted surface left by clearcut logging**. These **healthy forests are needed** for cleaner water and **to capture and store carbon** from the atmosphere **for a healthy climate**. We who care about our forests must insure that our political and business leaders know what kind of stewardship we want – industrial forestry or ecoforestry.

Advantage 2 is Growth

GIS use by developing countries for natural resources is key to economic development.

**Mennecke and West 1** write[[8]](#footnote-8)

The role of centralized planning, management, and decision making is continuing to increase in importance in many developing nations because of increasing pressures from overpopulation, depletion of natural resources, and financial instability (Todaro, 1994; Gillis, et al., 1992). As is the case with most planning and decision making activities, insufficient and inaccurate information will hurt these efforts. In fact, Todaro suggests that the two most prominent factors limiting the success of planning efforts in less developed countries (LDCs) are the lack of adequate data and a shortage of trained decision makers (1994, Ch. 16). **Spatial data is** particularly **valuable for** planning and **development efforts because they describe** the **geographic distribution of** economic **resources**, population, and other relevant factors. However, the collection, management, and application of spatial data can present unique and seemingly insurmountable problems for organizations seeking to leverage this data. Reasons for this situation include: 1. Data describing the geographic distribution of a nation’s resources are often difficult to collect, they are hard to verify, and they typically change frequently. Decision making at the national level in both developing and developed countries requires the integrated use of information from a multitude of sources. Both local and national **governments** in many developed countries **have found** geographic information systems (**GIS**) **to be a critical tool in resource management**, regional planning, and economic development. Unfortunately, the practical use of GIS in many developing countries is hampered by the lack of accurate and detailed spatial and demographic data, political considerations, and management issues. To highlight importance of these issues, we present a framework for GIS adoption in less developed countries and discuss these and other constraints in the context of this framework. We also offer ideas for technical, managerial, and policy initiatives that should be helpful in addressing impediments to GIS adoption. These ideas are summarized in a set of propositions and a related framework that shows our expectations about the impact of these initiatives on implementation success. 2. Many information systems do not adequately handle spatial data; therefore development personnel, managers, and computer specialists working in LDCs may have little or no experience with these types of data resources or the software used to manage and analyze them. 3. There are political issues associated with the implementation of any governmental information system that may be exacerbated by the inclusion of spatial data in the system. 4. Personnel issues associated with system development in any country may also be more important in LDCs or because of the use of GIS technologies. Mennecke and West briefly mentioned many of these obstacles to GIS implementation in their paper summarizing the role of GIS as a decision support and administrative tool for governments in LDCs (1998). This paper builds on this earlier work by exploring these and other obstacles to implementation in greater detail and by offering solutions that will help economic developers to find, create, and better manage both spatial and attribute data resources. Government policy makers, system developers, and academics working with support systems for decision making in LDCs will have a richer understanding of how to improve the chances of a 46 Oct-Dec 2001 Journal of Global Information Management successful GIS implementation. The next section of the paper reviews the role of GIS in national-level decision support systems to provide background information for the discussion that follows. Next, we present factors influencing the adoption and diffusion of GIS in developing countries and present a model that will be used to frame the remaining discussion. The next two sections present, respectively, data collection and management problems associated with implementing a national level GIS and strategies for overcoming these difficulties. Following this, we discuss managerial, technological, and policy initiatives that should prove useful in advancing GIS use in LDCs. The paper is concluded with a discussion of our conclusions and recommendations for additional research. THE ROLE OF GIS IN GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING The potential for using any technology to support governmental decision making is driven by the match between the capabilities of the technology and the needs of its potential users. This section reviews the common requirements of governmental decision makers in developing countries and presents a brief overview of the capabilities of GIS and its role in governmental decision making. For a more detailed exploration of the pertinent capabilities of GIS in government decision making see Mennecke & West (1998). **A vital role of government in** both developed and **developing nations is to foster economic development**; that is, to encourage “a process **which makes people** … **better off by increasing** their **command over goods and** services and by increasing the **choices open to them**” (Elkan, 1995; p. 8). To do this, governments must foster and manage the interrelationships between business development (e.g., retail and service providers), industrial development (e.g., wholesale goods and service producers), and community development (factors supporting infrastructure and the quality of life) (Harman, 1990; Moriarty, 1980; Wagner, 1978). A major difference between developed and developing countries is the degree to which existing institutions help to manage these interrelationships. In developed countries mature markets and bureaucracies play a large part in the management process. **In** many **developing countries,** however, **decisions** that might **otherwise** be **handled by private sector organizations** often **default to institutions in** the **government** sector. One trend in economic development for LDCs is an increasing reliance on developing private market solutions to economic problems (Elkans, 1995). Even though this approach removes the government from direct planning and control at the micro level it does not remove the burden of macro economic and policy analysis from government decision makers. **To perform policy analyses effectively,** however, **LDCs need info**rmation **about** the economic and **market conditions** both within their country and at broader scales. Harman (1990) suggests that these analyses can be performed with the aid of market information systems. These systems have three components: 1. A data inventory (e.g., past, present, and forecasted data about market conditions) 2. Lead indicators (e.g., indices used to measure and predict changes in market conditions), and 3. A decision support system (i.e., a method, process, or technology used to monitor market conditions and determine effective responses to changes) (p. 75). **Planning at the national level therefore requires** the **availability of accurate aggregated data** pertinent to a wide range of national objectives coupled with tools to support analysis and decision making. Of interest here is the fact that modern **GIS can be used as a** decision support system and as a **platform from which** a **data** inventory and lead indicators **can be** collected, managed, and **analyzed**. In fact, Mennecke and West (1998) built on the work of Yapa (1991) by making the case that GIS is important for LDCs as an appropriate administrative technology. **GIS is an appropriate administrative technology because**, when utilized at both the national and local levels, **its capabilities for managing** attribute and **spatial data can** be used to **better manage important** national **resources in the context of their location.** In this way, GIS has great potential for use as a coordination tool that facilitates more efficient data collection, data management, and planning. While GIS cannot address the entire range of strategic decisions faced by the government of an LDC, they do provide capabilities that make them suitable for this use without precluding the use of more traditional strategic decision support systems (Brudney & Brown, 1992; Drummond, 1995; Grupe, 1992; Mennecke and West, 1998; Worrall, 1994). In fact, **modern** commercial **GIS** products **can often be seamlessly integrated into existing info**rmation **systems** both at the client level as well as in organization-wide systems.

Development is key to solve poverty.

**World Bank 11** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

World Bank Group: Working to End Extreme Poverty and Hunger For more than 60 years, the World Bank Group has partnered with governments worldwide, reducing poverty by providing financial and technical help. **Since 2000, developing countries have cut extreme poverty in half**, achieving MDG 1 five years ahead of schedule. **That milestone was not met in much of Africa and South Asia, however. More than a billion people worldwide still live in extreme poverty**, and many more experience hunger and are vulnerable to environmental or price shocks. The Bank Group is working with the international community to end extreme poverty in a generation and boost incomes for the bottom 40 percent in each country. With food security a vital part of this effort, the Bank Group is boosting agriculture financing to $8-10 billion a year and is working in multiple ways to build agricultural productivity and resilience to climate change. Peanuts are one of Mali’s primary exports. Peanuts are one of Mali’s primary exports. We can reduce poverty and hunger by: investing in agriculture creating jobs expanding social safety nets expanding nutrition programs that target children under 2 years of age universalizing education promoting gender equality protecting vulnerable countries during crises Making Strides in Eradicating Poverty and Hunger **A meaningful path out of poverty requires a strong economy that produces jobs and good wages**; a government that can provide schools, hospitals, roads, and energy; and healthy, well-nourished children who are the future human capital that will fuel economic growth. Between 2003 and 2013, the Bank Group supported basic nutrition services for more than 211 million pregnant women, nursing mothers, adolescent girls, and children under 5. The Bank Group’s fund for the poorest countries –the International Development Association (IDA) – committed a record $16.3 billion in fiscal year 2013 to promote economic growth, increase shared prosperity, and fight extreme poverty.

Poverty causes structural violence which turns and outweighs nuclear war.

**Gilligan 96** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

The **14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to** the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those by genocide-or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000) deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even **a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R** . (232 million), it was clear that **even war cannot begin to compare with structural violence**, which continues year after year. In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. **This is**, in effect. **the equivalent of an ongoing, unending**~ in fact **accelerating,** thermo**nuclear war**, or genocide, **perpetrated on the weak and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the main cause of** behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to **war and genocide**). The question as to which of the two forms of violence-structural or behavioral-is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.

## Framework

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

Second, my standard controls the link to any practical reason or contract frameworks because rational agents would consent to a universal law to maximize utility to increase the chance of their own interests being satisfied.

Third, reductionism.

Brain studies prove personal identity doesn’t exist. **Parfit 84** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states can matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[13]](#footnote-13)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

Fourth, util is epistemologically necessary. Everyone values happiness whether they want to or not. Even people who claim they’re skeptics wouldn’t shoot themselves in the foot.

And fifth, act-omission distinction doesn’t apply to states.

**Sunstein and Vermuele 05** write[[14]](#footnote-14)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

Moral uncertainty is high now, but there’s room for improvement. **Parfit 84** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

Some people believe that there cannot be progress in Ethics, since everything has been already said. Like Rawls and Nagel, I believe the opposite. How many people have made Non-Religious Ethics their life's work? Before the recent past, very few. In most civilizations, **most people have believed in** the existence of a **God**, or of several gods. A large minority were in fact Atheists, whatever they pretended. But, **before the recent past, very few Atheists made Ethics their life’s work.** Buddha may be among this few, as may Confucius, and a few Ancient Greeks and Romans. After more than a thousand years, there were a few more between the Sixteenth and Twentieth centuries. Hume was an atheist who made Ethics part of his life's work. Sidgwick was another. **After Sidgwick,** there were several **atheists** who were professional moral philosophers. But most of these **did not do Ethics. They did Meta-Ethics.** They did not ask which outcomes would be good or bad, or which acts would be right or wrong. They asked, and wrote about, only the meaning of moral language, and the question of objectivity. **Non-Religious Ethics has been systematically studied**, by many people, **only since the** 19**60s. Compared with the other sciences**, Non-Religious **Ethics is** the youngest and **the least advanced.**

Adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks. **Bostrom 9** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction: **The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same.[[18]](#footnote-18) This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked. Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Cost-benefit analysis is feasible. Ignore any util calc indicts. **Hardin 90** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

Next is Theory Preempts

1. Err aff on theory because of a 5% neg bias at Strake Jesuit and 4% neg bias at Sunvite according to Joy of Tournaments. This also means presume aff if presumption matters.

2. Case outweighs theory. Students’ analyzing environmental issues is critical for sustainable solutions. This must be coupled with policy advocacy to succeed.

**Cotgrave and Alkhaddar 06**[[20]](#footnote-20)

Environmental education Many writers have determined that **the main aim of environmental education is to change attitudes, that will in turn change behaviour**. As long ago as 1976, Ramsey and Rickson identified that it has long been known that the basis for many environmental problems is irresponsible behaviour. Without a doubt, one of the most important influences on behaviour is attitude, that in turn is influenced by education. Campbell Bradley et al. (1999) stress the need for trying to change young people’s environmental attitudes because young people ultimately will be affected by, and will need to provide, solutions to environmental problems arising from present day actions. **As future policymakers, the youth** of today **will be responsible for ‘fixing’ the environment** **and they will be the ones who must be persuaded to act now** in order to avoid paying a high price to repair damage to the environment in the future, if indeed it is repairable. Therefore it appears that effective environmental education, which changes the attitudes of young people, is crucial. The (then) Department for Education (DFE) report, commonly known as the ‘Toyne Report’ (DFE, 1993), concluded that **as education seeks to lead opinion, it will do so more effectively if it keeps in mind the** distinctive nature of **its mission,** which is first and foremost **to improve** its **students’ understanding**. Their concern may well be awakened as a result; but it must be a properly informed concern. This does not necessarily mean treating the environment as a purely scientific issue, but does mean that the respective roles of science and ethics need to be distinguished, and the complexities of each need to be acknowledged. Failure to do this may lead all too readily to an ‘environmentalism’ which, by depicting possibilities as certainties, can only discredit itself in the long run and feed the complacency which it seeks to dispel. McKeown-Ice and Dendinger (2000) have identified the fact that scientific knowledge and political intervention will not solve the environmental problem on their own, thus implying that something additional is required to change behaviour. As has already been discussed, behaviour changes can only occur if attitudes change and this can be achieved through education. As Fien (1997) identifies, environmental education can play a key role by creating awareness, and changing people’s values, skills and behaviour. Introducing environmental elements into the curriculum can therefore be seen as a potentially effective way of transferring knowledge. This should in turn improve attitudes that will lead to improvements in environmental behaviour. Graham (2000) believes that it is crucial that building professionals not only participate in the creation of projects that have low environmental impact, but equally it is important that they learn to conceive, nurture, promote and facilitate the kind of paradigm changes seen as necessary to create a sustainable society. **There are** however **limitations as to what education can achieve on its own**, for as Jucker (2002) believes, **if we do not** do everything we can to **transform our political**, economic and social **systems** into more sustainable structures, **we might as well forget the educational part.**

3. Default to field context to determine T violations. That determines whether the plan is in the lit base. I meet. GIS tech prioritizes environmental protection over resource extraction, that’s Kuhn 13.

4. Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

**AFC preserves the value of the first aff**irmative constructive **speech. This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

5. Gutcheck against dumb theory. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

6. The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

7. Err against debaters who don’t disclose. It gives me an infinite research burden which kills fairness and pre-round topic education.

8. Err towards small schools on theory to account for resource disparity that makes it harder for me to win.

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